The following article consists of a few short remarks on the inevitable incomprehensibility of science on the one hand and, in order to overcome this incomprehensibility, on common structures between science and the life-world on the other.
The veil of ignorance that, in the opinion of many, today hides science from society, and the public from science, and which in consequence often hinders communication about science, might be more easily lifted if the following question is answered: How comprehensible is science, and how comprehensible can and should science be?
Even the most energetic attempts at making science comprehensible, and at winning society for its enterprise, cannot get around the fact that the scientic understanding remains in many cases a mystery for the unscientic understanding. One cannot simply conjure the comprehensibility of what science knows into being. Dicult scientic subjects cannot simply be translated in all their aspects into colloquial language and concepts. He who nonetheless perseveres in the attempt is often disappointed, and this disappointment cannot be laid at the feet of science. Science is in a well-dened sense unavoidably incomprehensible.
It is concerned with things that are not understandable to the layman either directly or indirectly, unless of course he his prepared to transform himself over the course of a long apprenticeship into a scientist.
And science speaks a language that only science itself can properly understand. This mutual untranslatability belongs to its essence, and is indeed intimately connected to the responsibility of science. Simply and a bit exaggeratedly, put: science loses its scientic character when it is made understandable, and few scientists can be prepared to make such a sacrice; conversely, everyday experience becomes incomprehensible when it is rendered scientically. 3. Science is a highly stylised form of pre-scientic forms of knowledge. Science has been characterised from its Greek origins on by its theoretical forms. One such form, which is also the form of our textbooks, is for example that of the proof. This is indeed the trademark of science -and yet it nds its partner in the everyday world, namely in the form of argumentative communication. Induction, which is the Jürgen Mittelstraÿ: The enigmatic nature of science 3 route from the particular to the general, and deduction, the route from the general to the particular, are not just instruments of the sciences.
But this means in turn that the world of science and the life-world are connected to each other by means of argumentative structures and structures of action. It is only that in the one world, that of science, stricter rules hold than in the other one, the life-world. These rules mark the path from the experiential form of knowledge to the theoretical form of the latter, a path which as a result does not lead us away from our common world, but rather deeper into this very same one by means of explananation and justication.
Let this suce as an answer to the question about how comprehensible science can or ought to be. Let me close with a last remark concerning this ought.
The path of a science that seeks to make itself comprehensible is beset by risks, and by the enemies of understanding, among whom number quite a few scientists. For if it is true that comprehensibility in the world of science cannot be merely willed into being, that dicult scientic subjects cannot be arbitrarily simplied, and that scientic terminology cannot completely be translated into everyday language, still there is a converse possibility, namely that of needlessly complicating matters in the name of science. This possibility is abetted in many areas by a jargon of incomprehensibility that does not advance science, but preserves it from presumptuous attempts to render it understandable. And this holds true just as much of the language in which science is expressed as it does of the theories in which it is represented. They are often like the emperor's new clothes, above all in the social sciences and the humanities, which are always under a special pressure to justify themselves, so that the ight into terminological fancy and esoteric language becomes particularly enticing. Simplicity appears as the enemy of one's own claims to signicance. But this means that science here legitimates itself with the credentials of its incomprehensibility (for after all, no one understands the language of modern cosmology, and it is most certainly a science). One speaks the language of Absolute Spirit, which reveals itself only to the initiated, to which one would of course like to belong.
Unfortunately such cases are by no means rare. But to think this way is to subvert the eorts of serious scientic and unscientic minds to orient themselves in a common and comprehensible world. For this reason, and in the light of the far-reaching speechlessness between science and society, a critique of science that is informed by the latter and practised with care is as important a task as the eorts of everyday understanding to comprehend the world of the scientic mind.
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